As a sidenote: In 1989, I went on a tour of Egypt in which I saw two sets of Ramesses II’s Kadesh inscriptions, in Luxor and Abu-Simbel. That trip ended with a visit to Turkey, where I toured Hittite sites, notably their former capital, Hattusas.

By William Sierichs Jr.

Literalist Bible worshipers have often pointed to real historical evidence to argue that miracle stories in their book could be true. Even many non-literalists play this game, rewriting the “sacred” text to make implausible events possible.

Thus, the Exodus story of 2-3 million Israelites escaping Egypt amid Cecil B. DeMille-level special effects is pared down into a few thousand Israelites slipping out quietly. An alternate hypothesis was that the explosion of a volcanic island in the Mediterranean could have caused the famous Plagues of Egypt, allowing oppressed Bedouin to flee. A lone reference to the land of Israel in a 12th-century BCE text about a pharaoh’s victories in the area of Palestine has been read to imply that the Exodus must have taken place in the 13th century. Yes, and “Gone With the Wind” could be based on a true story because there was a Civil War.

Historian Donald B. Redford points out the underlying flaw made by proponents of the Bible as history, which has included professional historians over the past century: They assume that a story must have some kernel of truth and then build a narrative mixing speculation drawn from fragments of evidence, instead of first asking the question: “Is there any reason to think that story X has a historical basis?” Redford dissects several Bible stories to show the very foundation is improbable. He actually makes a case that the Exodus has a historical origin, except that it was when oppressed Egyptians drove out their Hyksos overlords! He suggests reasons why it was drastically revised for later propaganda reasons.

I’m going to use two examples to illustrate the problems of the Bible as history, first a real historical event and then a well-established biblical fiction about real events that many people, not just literalists, think is true, at least to some degree.

Believers think Egyptian Pharaoh (a title, not a name, despite Exodus) Ramesses II really was Moses’/God’s foil in that story. In historical reality, Ramesses was one of the longest-lived kings of Egypt and built, or at least put his name on, many monuments.

For many historians, one of the most-fascinating episodes of his reign was the 13th-century BCE battle of Kadesh, when he was 25. It’s one of the best-documented battles in ancient history. It’s also one of the most-infuriatingly vague and controversial events in ancient history.

Ramesses left an extensive written record and massive, cartoon-like drawings of the battle on a plain in western Syria. Yet much of his account is problematic, to the point that historians have created sharply differing hypotheses about it. The only certain points of agreement now are that, after some combat, the Egyptians retreated and the Hittites held control of the disputed region.

Historians have always known that Egypt was a major power in the Bronze Age, but its history was shrouded in myths, propaganda and distortions. Ramesses loomed so large that the works and deeds of other kings were even ascribed to him.

Not until J.F. Champollion deciphered the Rosetta Stone in the 1820s, allowing historians to read ancient Egyptian, did people begin to sort out the mess. Numerous expeditions uncovered a fascinating assortment of texts, from officials’ letters to bureaucratic files to diplomatic archives to accounts of the pharaohs’ achievements. Unfortunately, the last items are often mostly propaganda with limited historical material; some kings even simply copied reports of earlier kings!

New Kingdom Egypt was born in the mid-16th century B.C.E. from the expulsion of the Hyksos, an Asiatic dynasty with probable Egyptian support.

Following the reunion of Egypt, its kings worked to secure its borders. In the later 16th century, Thothmosis I marched across Canaan and Syria, reaching the upper Euphrates, where he defeated the region’s ruler. In the next two centuries, his successors gradually established control up into northern Syria.

The most-important campaigns were under Thothmosis III in the mid-15th century. He captured the city of Megiddo after defeating a coalition of 330 Canaanite rulers (some probably Hyksos descendants) on the plain outside its walls (the “har-Megiddo,” or “Armageddon”). The king of Kadesh was the leader of the coalition, and it’s possible he was acting as an agent of the powerful Hurrian state of Mitanni, based in northeastern Syria and eastern Anatolia. Thothmosis captured Kadesh and crossed the Euphrates to defeat Mitanni. For the next century, Egypt was the dominant force in Canaan-Syria.

The emergence of the Hittites as the superpower of Anatolia, under King Suppiluliumas, coincided with a period of Egyptian weakness in the 14th century. For an unknown reason, Tutankhamon’s widow, Ankhesenamon, asked Suppiluliumas to send a son to marry her and be Egypt’s king. Suppiluliumas sent his son Zannanza. Unfortunately for Zannanza, a coup had replaced Egypt’s government, and he was murdered. Suppiluliumas retaliated with an invasion of Syria; Egyptian POWs brought a deadly, unknown plague that killed him and many of his people.

The coup led to the reign of Ramesses I, whose son Seti I and grandson Ramesses II set about restoring Egyptian power in Syria, which included Seti’s capture of Kadesh and defeat of the Hittites. When Ramesses II took the throne, the Hittites had regained control of Kadesh/Kinza and were pressuring Egyptian allies to accept the sovereignty of King Muwatallis, Suppiluliumas’ grandson.

HATTI
The Hittites were Egypt’s greatest rival, and ironically were as completely forgotten as Egypt’s imperial glory was remembered. The world knew their name only from scattered references in the Jewish scriptures as “sons of Heth.”

Long unrecognized, “The Odyssey” also referred to the Hittites in Book XI, when Odysseus told the ghost of Achilles that his son had slain Eurypylus, “the son of Telephus” and his forces, rendered “Ceteians” in a 19th-century translation, a variant of the Egyptian “Kheta,” now translated as Hittites. “Telephus” is Telepinus, a Hittite royal name.

When the Kadesh texts first were translated, historians weren’t quite sure whom Ramesses had fought. In 1905, noted Egyptologist W.M. Flinders Petrie believed the Hittites were a Syrian people. He concluded that after Ramesses repelled the Hittite assault on his camp, they “were then chased by the king to the junction of roads, probably the great meeting-place of roads at Homs, whence the allies fled to their own districts, and there was no longer any solid body to be followed. The chief of the Kheta fled back along the north bank to the entrance to Qedesh, where he was received by the remaining garrison.”

Soon after, archaeologists finally established that the Hittites were an Anatolian people, whose capital, Hattusas, was a major city, located about a hundred miles east of Ankara. The ruins yielded many diplomatic archives that are invaluable. One text was the Hittite copy of a peace treaty between Ramesses II and Hattusilis III, Muwatallis’ younger brother, known previously from Egyptian records, ending the war of which Kadesh was one battle.

The Hittite homeland was in central Anatolia, where its Indo-Hittite-speaking founders apparently emigrated in the first half of the 2nd millennium B.C.E. Despite powerful enemies all around and repeated setbacks, the Hittites gradually came to dominate much of Anatolia. In the early 16th century, King Mursilis I not only conquered the dangerous kingdom of Aleppo in Syria, but launched a blitzkrieg downriver to capture Babylon! The shock overthrew the reigning family of Babylonia, which was replaced by the Kassite dynasty.

The next two centuries were followed by imperial ups and downs, with Hattusas falling once to a coalition of enemies. A watershed event occurred in the mid-14th century, when Suppiluliumas seized the throne from the official heir, his brother Tudhaliyas, who was assassinated. Suppiluliumas destroyed Mitanni and secured control of northern Syria.

After Suppiluliumas’ fatal illness, his son Mursilis II struggled for nearly 30 years to defend the empire’s borders, leaving a relatively-powerful state to his son Muwatallis. After Seti’s defeat of Mursilis (or Muwatallis, by an alternate interpretation), the Hittites apparently replaced their two-man chariots with heavier, three-man chariots that were harder to maneuver but increased their fighting power. Muwatallis also put Hattusilis in charge of the defense of the unruly northern Hittite homeland.

By the early 13th century, the Hittites were ready for a renewed death match with Egypt. (Note: Dating systems vary; Kadesh was fought in 1300 B.C.E., 1295 or 1274.)

EGYPT
Egypt could raise sizable armies if needed from a population that one scholar estimates at about 4 million in the 14th century, with mercenaries available from beyond its frontiers. Egypt relied on large forces of archers and spearmen, but chariots carrying archers gave the army mobile firepower.

The army was divided into at least four divisions: Amon, Ptah, Ra and Set or Sutekh. The size of a division is unknown. Some scholars have argued for a standard 5,000-man force. Others point out that the number 5,000 comes from sources that do not pertain directly to an Egyptian division. Any commentary is speculative here, but Egypt was theoretically capable of putting forth a much-larger field army, so the size of a division might have varied depending upon the perceived threat. A campaign against the Hittites was much more serious than one in Canaan.

Egypt sometimes used Canaanite charioteers, the maryannu, likely provided by city-states under treaty obligations. However, most Canaan-Syria states apparently had small forces, as the Amarna letters show the local rulers frequently begged Egypt to send small forces of archers, as few as 50, and sometimes chariots, to protect them, usually from hostile neighbors, who were equally as insistent that Egypt assist them against the other petitioners. The population of Canaan (roughly modern Israel and the West Bank) has been estimated at 250,000 at most in the 14th century. Western Syria’s population likely was higher. The coastal city of Ugarit in northwestern Syria, a one-time Egyptian ally, might have been able to put 600 chariots in the field.

Ramesses II notably had a bodyguard of Shardana warriors, recognizable by their horned helmets and mustaches. He reportedly defeated a Shardana raid as a boy, and hired some prisoners into his service. The Shardana were one of the so-called Sea Peoples who attacked Egypt about a century later. Some migrated across the Mediterranean to an island which now bears their name: Sardinia.

THE HITTITES
The Hittite army normally relied on a mix of infantry spearmen and chariotry. The kings had a bodyguard, the Meshedi. Records show sizable supplies of composite bows and arrows were delivered to the empire, but archery does not appear to have played the same role in the Hittite army as the Egyptian. Surprise attacks and guerrilla warfare apparently were part of the Hittite tactical ops. A Hittite horse-training manual partially survives, showing horses received several years of careful training to prepare them for battle.

One of the most-intriguing aspects of the Egyptian Kadesh account is its list of Hatti’s allies in the battle. The Hittites’ national manpower probably was inadequate to deal with threats from so many sides. Surviving treaties show subject provinces were required to provide forces of infantry and chariotry, some at a ratio of 10-to-1. Kizzuwadna (Cilicia) had to supply 1,000 infantry and 100 chariots, for example.

The Egyptian account says the Hittites had 37,000 infantry and 3,500 chariots at Kadesh, implying a maximum of 47,500 men. Interestingly, this is a ratio of just under 11 infantry to 1 chariot, close to the ratios in treaties and some surviving Hittite battle accounts. As the Syrian allies at Kadesh might still have used two-man chariots, the army size probably was smaller; and this argument assumes the Egyptians had reliable intelligence of Muwatallis’ army when the Kadesh accounts were written later.

Stay tuned for Part II